


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
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30 October 1961

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

CONTENTS

1. Soviet party congress. (*Page i*)


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6. France-Algeria: French fear extremists may use scheduled peaceful Moslem demonstrations on 1 November to provoke violence. (*Page iii*)

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DAILY BRIEF

USSR: Khrushchev's latest revelations of crimes committed by Stalin during the 1930s have touched off a wave of public demands that his body be removed from the Lenin-Stalin mausoleum in Red Square. At the same time, there are some signs of Kremlin concern that the growing "cult of Khrushchev" might have adverse effects among the population.

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Party Secretary Frol Kozlov told the congress on 28 October that a continuation of present policies in Albania could lead to that country's exclusion from the Communist bloc.

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In references to the "anti-party group," Kozlov hinted that Voroshilov, Bulganin, and Pervukhin might be allowed to retain their party membership. [REDACTED] Page 1)

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France-Algeria: French security officials are inclined to believe statements by the provisional Algerian government (PAG) that the Moslem demonstrations scheduled for 1 November are intended to be peaceful. These officials fear, however, that the Secret Army Organization (OAS) or extremists among the European settlers, opposing negotiations with the rebels, may provoke the Moslems to violence, or that rebel extremists not under the control of the PAG may infiltrate the Moslem crowds and fire on French security forces. The French delegate general in Algiers told the US consul general last week that if that happens "our forces will defend themselves." If for any reason the demonstrations result in widespread violence, the OAS might capitalize on the ensuing tension to attempt to seize either Oran or Algiers, with a good chance of initial success at least in Oran.

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(Backup, Page 6)

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DAILY BRIEF

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Soviet 22nd Party Congress


In his address to the congress on 27 October, Khrushchev called for the construction of a monument to thousands of victims of Stalin's terror. He implicated Stalin in the 1934 murder of central party Secretary Sergey Kirov, which Stalin used as an excuse to begin the so-called "great purges" of the mid-1930s, and asserted that Stalin's policies drove heavy industry commissar Sergo Ordzhonikidze to suicide in 1936. According to Western press sources in Moscow, publication of these charges on 28 October was followed by demands for the removal of Stalin's body from the mausoleum.

The American Embassy reports that Moscow intellectuals are asking how Khrushchev can continue his attacks on Stalin while building his own "personality cult." Khrushchev himself asserted that the tribute he has received is in no way officially sponsored.

On 28 October, party Secretary Frol Kozlov--Khrushchev's second in command--delivered his report on the proposed new statutes governing the internal life of the Soviet party which were published for "discussion" last August. His claim that the proposals had been unanimously approved at "all party meetings, conferences, and congresses without exception" indicates that the statutes will be ratified in their original form.

In the wake of Khrushchev's call on Albanian leaders Hoxha and Shehu to resign in order to end the "cult of personality" in their country, Kozlov further warned that a continuation of present "pernicious policies" could lead to Albania's "detachment from the socialist camp" and the isolation of the Albanian party in the world Communist movement. He stated that the only proper method of handling the Soviet-Albanian polemic was through "principled censure" and by seeking out "ways and means of surmounting the differences."

There are rumors in Moscow that presidium candidate member Mikhail Pervukhin and former Premier Bulganin will address



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the congress. They will presumably confess their complicity in the anti-party group, a move which will not prevent their removal from the party central committee but which could spare them the loss of their membership in the party. Former President Voroshilov's latest recantation and acknowledgment of the correctness of the current party line were read to the congress by Khrushchev, who pointed out that "one good turn deserves another." The three unrepentant ringleaders of the group, Molotov, Malenkov, and Kaganovich, will almost certainly be expelled from the party, however.

The congress moves into its final phase on 30 October with "debates" on Kozlov's report. Pro-forma ratification of the party statutes will be followed by selection of the new central committee, which in turn will "elect" the party presidium and secretariat. Reports from Moscow continue to indicate that adjournment of the congress is scheduled for the latter part of this week. [REDACTED]

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NOTE: The first sentence of the second paragraph of the backup article on the 22nd CPSU Congress on Page 1 of the CIB of 28 October 1961 should read: "In addition to the accusation that it failed to support 'de-Stalinization,' the anti-party group is charged with incorrect assessment of the international scene." [REDACTED]

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Algerian Demonstrations May Produce Violence

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A French official in the Ministry of Algerian Affairs said on 27 October that he expected outbreaks not only in Algeria, but also in metropolitan France on 1 November. [French Delegate General Morin has pointed out to the US consul general that the good intentions of the PAG are not enough to ensure that the demonstrations will not result in violence. He said that if the Moslem demonstrators displayed rebel flags--which infuriated French Army elements during the December 1960 riots--French forces would have to remove them.]

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[] the PAG plans to carry out assassinations under cover of the demonstrations.

There is some indication that the Moslems may confine their demonstrations to predominantly Moslem areas of the Algerian cities. The bulk of the European population will probably remain as aloof as possible, but Moslem destruction of European property or attacks on Europeans could lead the settlers to violent retaliation.

The PAG is reportedly aware that the Moslem demonstrations in metropolitan France have already harmed the rebel cause in France and that this effect will be compounded if violence breaks out on 1 November. It is apparently willing to accept the risk, however, in view of its major effort, begun soon after its reorganization in August, to "mobilize" the Algerian population. There are also indications that the PAG feels compelled to do something spectacular to redirect attention to the rebel struggle with France because of the great publicity the operations of the OAS have attracted in recent weeks.

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The OAS, despite reports of increasing settler disenchantment with its methods, remains a strong threat to the French Government. It resumed clandestine broadcasts in Algeria on 27 October. [French officials in Algeria are said to be reluctant to carry out their duties for fear of OAS reprisals. Two French]

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[redacted] officers killed in Algeria last week were members of special units organized to combat the OAS, and an arrested member of an OAS assassination squad stated that there are 30 more such squads. Moreover, the recent arrest of OAS leaders in Spain may have removed a moderating force on extremists in Algeria. The American Embassy in Paris feels that any OAS success in seizing Oran or Algiers would jeopardize the resumption of negotiations by convincing the PAG that De Gaulle could not implement the terms of a settlement. [redacted]

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